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Abstract 
 
There is a hot debate on whether internationally diversified and or industrially diversified strategy 
gains premium or discount on firm value. Most of the empirical studies on this topic were conducted 
in developed markets. However, Indonesia, as an emerging market, offers its unique characteristic in 
terms of ownership structure. For instance, Indonesia is dominated by family firms, but its SOEs 
perform better compared to family firms. This research aims to investigate the role of ownership 
concentration on the value of international and industrial diversification in Indonesia. We investigate 
how that relationship works in respect of different firm’s identity, such as different ownership level, 
or different owners (family, government, and foreign). We investigate the value of diversification and 
ownership structure of Indonesian listed firms over a panel of 2006-2010. We use robust panel 
regression where we report the probability values based on white robust standard errors that control 
for heteroscedasticity errors, as well as firm clustering, year clustering, period effect, and industry 
effect, which induce a within firm serial correlation error structure. To support the results, we also 
provide graphical evidence of the link between ownership structure, diversification strategy, and firm 
value. We find that ownership concentration has a prevalent and significant effect on the value of 
diversification. Further, we also find value discount in the industrial diversification of family firms, 
and value discount in the international diversification of foreign firms. Overall, our results are 
consistent with the conjecture that the value of diversification is adversely affected by the agency 
problem, suggesting that ownership concentration and firm identity play an important role in respect 
of the value of diversification. 
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1. Introduction 
 The value of corporate diversification is a hot debate. Firms can choose to diversify 
internationally or diversify business segments in various related and unrelated industries. Although 
international diversification may enable firms to capture valuable operating synergies, firms might 
incur additional costs and risks when investing in foreign markets, as they will have to contend with 
exchange rate risk, political risk, and the coordination costs incurred when managing resources over a 
larger international arena. However, while industry diversification may enable firms to gain efficient 
resource allocation through the internal capital market, thereby reducing adverse selection, and being 
industrially productive, becoming industrially diversified might harm a firm’s performance through 
the cost of inefficient capital, information asymmetries, and indeed the agency cost (see Stein, 1997; 
Stulz, 1999; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Rajan et al., 2000; Campa and Kedia, 2002).  
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 The value of diversification has been extensively investigated in the developed market (e.g., 
Stimpert and Duhaime, 1997; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Fauver et al., 2004; Chen and Yu, 2012), but 
the results cannot be generalised to the emerging markets as their capital markets are not that liquid 
and are also less integrated. Based on the internal market hypothesis, firms in less developed capital 
markets, such as emerging countries may be induced to diversify because these firms rely more on the 
internal capital markets for sources of funding (Gertner et al., 1994; Shackman, 2007). When firms 
from emerging countries expand their territory to advanced economies, they will enjoy scope and 
scale advantages from internalizing functions provided by external intermediaries or institutions 
located in advanced economies (Stulz, 1990; Stein, 1997; Campa and Kedia, 2002). When firms from 
emerging countries expand their industry, they will enjoy the advantage of efficient resources and 
cheaper cost of capital (Stulz, 1999; Khanna and Plepu, 2000; Shackman, 2007). These diversified 
firms should provide more incentives to diversify, as the gain from diversification is greater in both 
effectiveness and efficiency (Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Williamson, 
1985).   
 Indonesia is the second largest emerging economy behind China, with the 10
th
 largest GDP in 
the world. Firms in Indonesia ventured their businesses internationally as early as the late 1950s, 
promoted by the “Light House Policy” of President Soekarno. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
has also encouraged Indonesian firms to diversify exponentially over the last two decades. In fact, 
Pananond (2008) reported that Indonesian outward foreign direct investment has increased 
enormously from USD86 million in 1990 to USD6,940 million in 2000, and jumped further to 
USD21,425 million in 2007. The increasing trend of international diversification seems to have 
continued exponentially as reported in a recent report of UNCTAD in that Indonesian OFDI totalled 
to USD89,000 million or 9% of the GDP during the period 2004-2012, the highest after Singapore in 
the Southeast Asia region. This is also reflected in most empirical work. For instance, Claessens et al. 
(2001) documented that Indonesia had a high percentage (47%) of multi-segment firm-years 
compared to the US, which had only 20% of multi-segment firm-years, and Indonesian diversified 
firms had the highest asset size among its peers in Southeast Asia over the period 1990 to 1996. 
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Mitton (2002) also showed that 46% of Indonesian companies were reported as diversified firms. In a 
smaller sample, Lins and Servaes (2002) reported that 20% of Indonesian firms were well diversified. 
 It has been documented that the majority of the listed firms in Indonesia were family-
controlled firms (Claessens et al., 2002). These family-controlled firms are closely related to the 
internal market hypothesis due to their pyramiding and crossholdings, through which funds can be 
allocated easily among the firms within the group to facilitate better financial firms (e.g., Khanna and 
Palepu, 2000; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Claessens et al., 2006). Moreover, the Indonesian 
government practise protectionism that distorts the value of resources, and makes diversification more 
viable (Kock and Guillen, 2001). As such, because Indonesia has a less developed financial market, 
firms extract financing through a diversification strategy (internal market). In addition, Indonesian 
firms bear a higher currency risk due to the volatile Rupiah. Moreover, the rigidity of the policy may 
affect the diversification strategy of State-Owned Entreprises (SEO) in Indonesia. Therefore, 
Indonesia offers a unique environment to investigate the value impact of diversification in the context 
of corporate governance. 
  Our paper contributes by investigating whether the value of diversification gives benefits or 
costs to Indonesian firms. We examine the diversification effect on firm value controlling for both 
international and industrial diversification. We follow the modified excess value of Fauver et al. 
(2004) as the proxy for firm value with four control variables, namely, size, profitability, growth and 
leverage. In terms of corporate governance, we focus on two aspects – ownership concentration and 
ownership identity. Our results show that there is value discount from industrial diversification, which 
is in line with our agency cost hypothesis. For ownership identity, we re-run the sub sample based on 
firm identity, namely, family, foreign, and government and surmise three findings: (1) industrially 
diversified family firms have value discount, (2) internationally diversified foreign firms have value 
discount, and (3) there is no effect of diversification strategy and expropriation on government firms’ 
excess value. For robustness, we examine whether the level of ownership concentration moderates the 
diversification-value link. We set two new thresholds for ownership concentration, higher than 30% 
and higher than 50%. We find evidence that the value discount of diversified firms diminishes if the 
ownership concentration threshold is higher than 50%. Overall, the results suggest that diversification 
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strategy has a different effect on different firm identities. The effects may be diminished if the firms 
have high ownership concentration, which is consistent with the agency cost hypothesis, or, more 
specifically, the entrenchment hypothesis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, related literature is briefly reviewed. 
Section 3 describes the data, sample selection criteria, and preliminary analysis. Section 4 discusses 
the methodology concerning the estimation and significance of the results. Section 5 presents the 
conclusion and implications of the research. 
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Diversification Strategy, Ownership Structure, and Firm Value 
The diversification strategy can be divided into international diversification and industrial 
diversification, and both strategies play a key role in the strategic behaviour of firms (Hitt, Hoskisson, 
& Ireland, 1994; Denis et al., 2002). This diversification strategy has both benefits and costs. Firms 
can benefit from diversification through the internal capital market (Williamson, 1979), or through 
higher debt capacity (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). The cost of diversification stems mainly from the 
agency problem, which arises when managers diversify because of their personal interest, such as 
prestige, remuneration, job-related risk reduction, and promotion; even though the managers know 
that expansion might reduce firm value (Bergen et al., 1992; Koch and Nafziger, 2012; Shen, 2012). 
Recent literature documents that diversification strategies are more associated with discount value 
than premium value (i.e., Berger and Ofek, 1995; Denis et al., 1997; Lins and Servaes, 2002; Lamont 
and Polk, 2002; Fauver et al., 2004). The expropriation could be a factor because large shareholders 
have extensive control rights to benefit themselves rather than to benefit the managerial or minority 
shareholders (Lins and Servaes, 2002; Chen and Yu, 2012). Another explanation for the discount 
value is the ownership characteristics. Lins and Servaes (1999) explained that the value of 
diversification is different in Germany, Japan, and the US due to the environment of institutional and 
ownership characteristics (for example, many Japanese firms are owned by formal industrial groups 
known as Keiretsu, which does not exist in many countries). The difference in the institutional 
environment and ownership characteristics give different results for the value of diversification. The 
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results of Lins and Servaes (2002) showed no effect of diversification on the value of the firm in 
Germany, small value discount of diversification in Japan, and relatively large in the UK and US due 
to different characteristics of ownership.  
Large ownership might be detrimental to the wealth of diversified firms because owners are 
less likely to squander corporate wealth via poor diversification choice, or manager-owners might 
derive non-pecuniary benefits of diversification (Morck et al., 1988; Lins and Serveas, 2002). Large 
ownership may represent their own interests, which does not need to coincide with the interests of 
minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). A simpler example can be seen in Figure 1, which 
shows that the Salim Family has ultimate ownership of more than 50%, and controls Indofood (listed 
food manufacturer firm) through First Pacific. Not only the business chain, such as raw materials, 
packaging and shipping, but in exporting the final product to countries in the Middle East it also uses 
an affiliated/related party to the detriment of minority wealth because of the role of large ownership 
(entrenchment hypothesis). This is consistent with Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel and Gutierrez (2001), 
and Barclay and Holderness (1989) who documented that large ownership stakes reduce the 
probability of bidding by other agents or ignoring other better firms outside the group, choosing a 
related party, thereby reducing the value of the firm. This explains why diversified firms with high 
ownership concentration tend to have discount value.  
Specifically, in the international diversification literature, Fauver et al. (2004) found that 
agency cost does affect the value of international diversification after controlling the ownership 
structure variables. They concluded that managers go for international expansion because of their 
personal interests rather than those of the company. Other studies, i.e., Jensen, (1986), Stulz, (1999), 
and Lee et al. (2012), identified the same findings by suggesting that agency problems are the main 
driver in the value of international diversification. The rationale behind the failure of international 
diversification is that firms invest more heavily in intangible assets, such as technology and 
advertising (Lu and Beamish, 2004). Further, Bodnar et al. (2003) found that the value impact of 
international diversification in US is discounted. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
 
7 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant relationship between international diversification and firm value, 
where internationally diversified firms have a value discount 
 
Another diversification strategy, industrial diversification, has more consistent findings compared to 
international diversification. The empirical findings of Denis et al. (2002) and Fauver et al. (2004) 
showed that industrially diversified US firms have an effect on the value of the firm. Lins and Servaes 
(1999) found a significant relationship between industrial diversification and firm value in Japan and 
the UK. For the East Asia region, Lins and Servaes (2002), without controlling the ownership 
structure, found discounted value for industrial diversification in Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. From the view of agency theory, the plausible 
explanation for the significant value impact of industrial diversification is that the costs of industrial 
diversification outweigh the benefits because it potentially benefits corporate managers through 
increased power and prestige, through compensation arrangements, or through personal risk reduction 
(Denis et al., 1997; Denis et al., 2002). This leads us to hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant relationship between industrial diversification and firm value, 
where industrially diversified firms have a value discount. 
 
2.2 Ownership Concentration as moderating effect 
The effects of ownership on the value of firms have been investigated extensively. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argued that ownership concentration provides strong motivation to maximize the 
firm value, as the ultimate owners are able to collect information and oversee the managers. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997), and Claessens et al. (2002) also stated that a large ownership concentration might 
offset the agency cost as the large shareholders are able to put pressure on managers. Their view is 
supported by many empirical studies, such as Kim and Nofsinger (2007), who found the role of 
ownership concentration on agency cost-firm value relationship. In short, we can hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: Ownership concentration is related to firm value. A higher level of ownership 
concentration leads to higher firm value 
 
However, the recent trend of ownership empirical research leans towards the moderating role of 
ownership concentration. Because the alignment and entrenchment effect of ownership concentration 
might change the predictors of firm values (i.e., Fauver et al., 2004; Davies et al., 2005; King and 
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Santor, 2008), we continue to investigate whether ownership concentration has a moderating role on 
the diversification-firm value relationship. We find that the literature documents that a certain level of 
ownership concentration might induce firm performance, but, in a much higher concentration, the 
premium value is diminished. For instance, Wiwattanakantang (2001) reported that firm value 
declines at 25% to 50% of ownership, but improves at 75% concentration, which is consistent with 
the findings of Short and Keasey (1999). Fauver et al. (2004) arrive at a similar conclusion in that the 
value of diversification strategies strengthen 10-30% but diminish if more than 30%. Lins and Servaes 
(1999) also concluded that 10-30% ownership gives severe value for industrial diversification.  
Hypothesis 4: Ownership concentration plays an important role in the relationship between industrial 
diversification and firm value. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Ownership concentration plays an important role in the relationship between industrial 
diversification and firm value. 
 
2.3 Corporate Governance and Diversification Strategy in Indonesia 
 Indonesia represents an interesting research context since it is an example of a developing 
economy in transition. However, despite its remarkable economic growth, there is not much published 
research concerning how the ownership structure of Indonesian firms affects the diversification value. 
This is because Indonesia has a different ownership structure and the data are hard to retrieve.  
The dossiers show that only around 20% of Indonesian companies are owned by the government 
(Claessens, Djankov, Lang, 1999; Alijoyo et al., 2004), and that these state-owned enterprises play an 
important role in Indonesia’s economy. One example is that the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
dominated the Forbes 2000 World biggest Indonesian public companies (see Table 1). One-third of 45 
stocks that steer Bursa Indonesia are SOEs. Indonesia as one of the largest extractive countries, 
benefits the SOEs due to the protectionism policy. The constitution of Indonesia, which instructs that 
“sectors of production which are important and affect the life of the people shall be controlled by the 
State” means that SOEs in Indonesia literally control and manufacture all the natural resources. This 
protectionism makes SOEs in Indonesia perform well economically (Treverton et al., 1998; Astami, 
Tower, Rusmin, and Neilson, 2010). Interestingly, considering the good performance of Indonesian 
SOEs, there has been no comprehensive empirical study of SOE characteristics effects and ownership 
structure on firm performance, especially in gauging international and industrial diversification. 
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Table 1 List of Indonesian Firm in Forbes Global 2000 based on their Assets 
No 
World 
Rank 
Name Industry Type of Owner 
1 446 Bank Mandiri Banking Government 
2 461 Bank Rakyat Indonesia Banking Government 
3 613 Bank Central Asia Banking Family 
4 685 Telekom Indonesia Telco Government 
5 922 Bank Negara Indonesia Banking Government 
6 1188 Perusahaan Gas Negara Oil, Gas, & Mining Government 
7 1378 Gudang Garam Cigarette Family 
8 1425 Semen Indonesia Cement Family 
9 1453 Bank Danamon Banking Foreign 
Note: compiled from Forbes Global 2000 edition year 2012 
 
The domination of Indonesian family firms in economic activities provides a unique characteristic and 
interesting angle for this study. Claessens et al. (1999) surmised that 67% of listed firms in Indonesia 
were family owned, and showed that almost 85% of the companies appointed managers belonging to 
the controlling group. The owners usually participate in the management of the firm, and influence the 
strategic decisions, including going to international diversification and or industrial diversification. 
Morck and Yeung (2003) argue that the management of family-controlled firms, acting solely for the 
controlling family, potentially worsens the agency problem. Further, Indonesia has been characterised 
as having a weak institutional environment (Patrick 2001), where poor legal enforcement and the 
absence of a market for corporate control have been claimed as facilitating controlling family-owners 
in diverting firm resources (Krishnamurti et al., 2005).  
 Table 2 lists the 10 top family firms in Indonesia to show their diversification strategy 
industrially. These top 10 family firms have industrial diversification through their groups (holdings). 
For instance, Djarum group, which is owned by the Hartono family, has diversified from being the 
biggest cigarette producer in Asia (Djarum) to one of biggest banks in Indonesia, Bank Central Asia. 
This diversification gives US$15.5 billion wealth to the ultimate owner – Robert Budi Hartono. 
Another example is the First Pacific group, which is owned by Salim family, who diversified their 
industry from being the biggest food producer in Indonesia and Nigeria (Indofood) to the Cement and 
Telco industry. This industrial diversification gives the ultimate owner, Anthony Salim, a wealth of 
US$10.1 billion. However, it is noteworthy, as shown in Table 1, that government firms, which may 
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avoid aggressive industrial diversification and international diversification, have higher assets than 
family firms that are like to diversify industrially.
1
  
Table 2 List of Top 10 Family Firms in Indonesia and its Diversification Strategy 
Source: Globe Asia 
Another important factor to note is the different diversification schemes among Indonesian firms. For 
instance, the Hartono Family (see Figure 1) does not always diversify its business through its business 
group. Its main business, cigarettes (Djarum), is directly under the founder-family. Yet, for the 
diversification strategy, Hartono set up another business group (see the relationship between Farindo, 
Bank Central Asia, and India Bull). Different from the Hartono family, the Salim group is more 
aggressive and complicated in its diversification. The Salim family totally uses its business group 
(First Pacific) to control Indofood Sukses Makmur (hereafter Indofood), the biggest processed food 
manufacturing in Indonesia. Salim uses Indofood to acquire other business, such as PIPS Investment 
(Finance) and Bogasari Flour (Flour manufacturer). Moreover, Salim used Indofood for international 
diversification by acquiring a Singapore based company (IFAR) through its subsidiary. Interestingly, 
Salim used IFAR to acquire London Sumatera Plantation (one of the biggest plantation companies in 
Indonesia) meaning that Salim acquired a domestic firm by using an international firm. This is the 
complexity of the Salim diversification strategy. 
 Government firms also provide an interesting diversification strategy because they are prudent 
in implementing the diversification strategy due to the red tape and legal constraints. Figure 1 depicts 
                                                 
1
 It is very hard for Indonesian SOEs to have a diversification strategy industrially and internationally, because 
SOEs face considerable bureaucracy, in which legal permission from the Minister is needed to comply with UU 
No.19 tahun 2003 tentang BUMN (Law No. 19 Year 2003 about SOE). 
No Family Name 
Group Name 
Ultimate Owner's 
wealth 
Major Industry Diversification 
1 Hartono 
Djarum US$15.5 billion 
Cigarette, Banking, Electronics, Property, Agrobusiness, 
Multimedia 
2 Eka Tjipta Sinar Mas US$13.1 billion Plantation, Pulp and Paper, Property, Investment, Media 
3 Salim First Pacific US$10.1 billion Banking, FMCG, Cement, Telecommunication 
4 Wonowidjojo Gudang Garam US$6 billion Cigarette, Property, Investment, FMCG, Mining 
5 Sitorus 
Wilmar 
International 
US$ 3.7 billion Plantation, FMCG, Property 
6 Bakrie Bakrie Group US$ 2.5 billion Metal, Telco, Infrastructure, Energy, Plantation 
7 Sampoerna Sampoerna Group US$ 2.4 billion Cigarette, Plantation, Investment, Property 
8 Sondakh Rajawali Group US$ 2.4 billion Cigarette, Mining, Plantation, Property, Telco 
9 Riady Lippo Group US$ 2.2 billion Banking, Property, Plantation, FMCG, Telco, Investment 
10 Tanoto Royal Golden Eye US$ 2.1 billion Pulp and Paper, Plantation, Energy 
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two of the biggest government firms. Telekomunikasi Indonesia (Telkom), which undertakes 
industrial diversification in the same supply chain of the core business, which is telecommunication. 
For instance, Telkom acquired Telkomsel (telecommunication provider) and Infomedia 
Telecommunication, which are also in the telecommunication business line. Similar behaviour was 
found with Semen Gresik – the largest cement manufacturer – which diversified industrially to real 
estate business and mining business. 
 The last part of Figure 1 shows the unique diversification strategies of foreign firms, where 
those firms tend to have direct diversification in multiple industries. Jardine Matheson (UK-based 
firm) acquired Astra Indonesia International (ASII) from the Salim family. ASII is used to diversify 
their business to many sectors, for example, plantation (Astra Agro Lestari), banking (Permata Bank), 
Automotive spare parts (Astra Auto), heavy equipment (United Tractors), and even IT Solutions 
(Astra Graphia). Meanwhile, other foreign firms, such as Unilever have a different diversification 
strategy, which is plain and straight. Unilever Indonesia just diversified their business into the same 
business line or business support, such as marketing (Anugerah Lever) or distribution (Technopia 
Lever). 
 These three major blockholders, family, government, and foreign, have different 
characteristics to each other. Family firms, for example, relatively, tend to have aggressive behaviour 
in diversification strategy. This is consistent with previous literature, such as Claessen et al. (2002), 
and Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006), who suggested that the aggressiveness of Asian family firms in 
diversification leads to value discount. La Porta et al. (1999) confirmed this by finding the abuse of 
controlling power in family firms leading to value discount. This is different from the Indonesian 
government results. Indonesia has a strict regulation concerning losses for government firms. Loss can 
be interpreted as corruption based on the anti-corruption law No 31 year 1999, which explains the 
straight formation of government business units, as their managers are fearful of diversification, 
industrially and internationally. The literature, such as Tian and Estrin (2008), and Prabowo and 
Simpson (2011), confirmed this by showing the evidence that the bureaucrats that run the government 
firms might also not be interested in maximizing firm value. In contrast, foreign firms in Indonesia 
usually just choose either industrial diversification or international diversification. Moreover, similar 
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to Jardine Matheson, foreign firms tend to industrially diversify on the same product line. If we 
compare this with the Hartono family or Salim family (family-owned group), we can see that those 
family groups tend to have all industries in their conglomerate (from plantation, manufacturing, 
investment, to real estate; see Table 2 for details). This is supported by the literature stating that 
foreign firms enter the market with expertise in the line of the product, have superior capital 
(Boardman, Shapiro, and Vining, 1997), and tend to be selective (Suto, 2003). With these advantages, 
foreign firms are usually found to outperform family firms or even sometimes government firms (see 
Fauver et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2012). Based on these dossiers we develop our hypothesis as below: 
Hypothesis 6: The value of diversification has different effects for different types of firm identity 
 
Hypothesis 7: Family firms underperform in diversification strategies compared to their peer foreign 
firms and government firms. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Excess value 
 Firm value is measured by the excess value, which was developed by Berger and Ofek (1995), 
and later modified by Fauver et al. (2004). The excess value is calculated using the natural logarithm 
of the ratio of actual to imputed market value of each individual firm. Although there are many 
measures of firm value, such as capital-sales ratio, capital-assets ratio, and/or capital-earnings ratio, 
they yielded the similar results (see Berger and Ofek, 1995; Bodnar et al., 1999; Denis et al., 2002; 
Fauver et al., 2004). Because of the lack of segment assets and earnings for our sample data, the 
capital-sales ratio is chosen as the proxy. The actual value is measured by the consolidated firm’s 
capital-to-sales ratio. For single-segment firms, imputed value is calculated as the median market-to-
sales ratio among all single-segment firms in the same industry. For multi-segment firms, imputed 
value is calculated by taking a weighted-average of the imputed values for each of the firm’s 
segments, where the weights reflect the proportion of the overall firm’s sales that come from each 
segment. Firms have a positive excess value (i.e., a premium) if the overall company’s value is greater 
than the ‘‘sum of the parts.’’ In contrast, firms have a negative excess value if their value is less than 
the imputed value that would be obtained by taking a portfolio of pure-play firms that operate in the 
same industries as the diversified firm. 
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3.2 Control Variables 
 Prior research in estimating the excess value (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995; Fauver et al., 2004) 
showed that there are four factors that could affect the firm market-sales ratio, namely, firm size, firm 
profitability, growth opportunity, and leverage. The basic model is given below: 
                                                               
 In measuring the firm size, we follow the commonly used proxy, Bain (1968) firm size proxy, 
which is measured by using the log of assets (LTA). Meanwhile, other control variables have been 
developed by following previous research in corporate governance (Kim and Lyn, 1984; Lang and 
Stulz, 1994; Lins and Servaes, 1999; Fauver et al., 2004; Chu, 2009), where growth opportunities is 
measured by the capital expenditure-sales ratio (CES). Meanwhile, profitability is measured by the 
ratio of operating income – sales ratio (OIS), and leverage is measured by using the ratio of debt to 
common share equity. Therefore, for all the four explanatory variables, we deduct it with the annual 
industry average to obtain four new series, i.e., relative LTA (RLTA), relative OIS (ROIS), relative 
CES (RCES), and relative LEV (RLEV). Hence, the empirical regression model is as follows: 
tititititi RLEVRCESROISRLTAValue ,,4,3,2,1                (1a) 
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Figure 1 The scheme of Business Model in Diversification strategy
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Note:  Hartono family and Salim family are family groups. Astra Indonesia and Unilever Indonesia are foreign firms. 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia and Semen Gresik are Government firms. * means the firm is listed on Indonesian stock 
exchange. The scheme is based on 2010 annual report. Straight line     (  ) means industry diversification. Dashed line  
(       ) means international diversification. 
 
3.3 International Diversification and Industrial Diversification 
This study categorized firms into three categories based on each firm’s international and 
industrial diversification. The category is a binary dummy variable that equals 1 for internationally 
diversified firms, or industrially diversified firms, or both internationally and industrially diversified 
firms, and equals 0 otherwise. This method follows Fauver et al. (2004). 
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3.4 Ownership Structure  
 As the objective of this study is to investigate the role of ownership structure on the impact of 
international and industrial diversification, this study employs ultimate ownership (UO) to represent 
ownership concentration. It is appropriate to use UO since pyramidal and cross-holding ownership 
structures among firms are pronounced in many East Asian countries where the control rights are not 
equal to cash flow rights. The separation of the control rights and ownership (or cash flow rights) is 
created to benefit the large shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999) where control rights consequently 
exceed cash flow rights. Following Claessens et al. (2002), we use the control rights of the ultimate 
owner of the largest shareholder comprised of direct and indirect shareholdings as a proxy for UO to 
determine the ownership concentration. The use of cash flow rights may not be appropriate since a 
number of firms in Indonesia are owned indirectly through a chain of firms that are privately held 
(Arifin, 2003). Cash flow rights refer to direct shareholdings of the owner through the purchase of 
If firm has > 10% foreign sale 
If firm has ≤ 10% foreign sale 
If firm has > 1 segmental industry 
If firm has ≤1 segmental industry 
If firm has > 10% foreign sale, and > 1 segmental industry 
If firm has ≤ 10% foreign sale, or ≤ 1 segmental industry, or both 
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shares, while control rights refer to the total of direct and indirect shareholdings of the owner. A 
person is said to have indirect shareholdings in firm A when he has shareholdings in firm B, which, in 
turn, owns shares in firm A. Obviously, the gap between the cash flow and control rights only arises 
when there are indirect shareholdings by the ultimate owner. In other words, when an owner only 
owns a firm through direct shareholdings, the cash flow rights are equal to the control rights. 
Furthermore, from the corporate governance perspective, the concentration of control rights has better 
explanatory power than the cash flow rights (Claessens et al., 2000). This research aims to investigate 
further the role of ownership concentration on the link of diversification-performance. For this reason, 
we modify equation 1 by adding in the interactive terms. Note that our threshold for ownership 
concentration is 20%. The model is as follows: 
 
titi
titititi
tiINDtiINTtitititi
UOINTIND
UOINDUOINTUODINTIND
DDRLEVRCESROISRLTAValue
,,12
,11,10,8,7
,,6,,5,4,3,2,1
)*(
)*()*(






 (2) 
 
 For robustness, we follow Fauver et al. (2004) in investigating further the value of 
diversification by introducing the identity of firms. There are three categories of firms: Family 
Owned, Government Owned, and Foreign Owned. We repeat Model (2) according to each type of 
firm identity. By doing this, our expectation is to reveal which type of firm has premium/discount 
value of diversification, and, moreover, we can explore further whether the dominant type of firm in 
Indonesia, family firms, manage to outperform the value of foreign firms and government firms in 
terms of diversification.  
 
3.4 Data  
We retrieve data from the Worldscope database to collect a panel set of annual financial data 
for Indonesian publicly listed firms from the years of 2006 to 2010. Our initial sample covers all 931 
publicly listed firms on the Indonesian stock exchange. We follow Fauver et al. (2004) in using two-
digit SIC codes to classify industrial segments. In fact, our database provides the sales into geographic 
and product segment data based on the SIC codes. Consistent with previous studies (Fauver et al., 
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2004; Lins and Servaes, 1999), the financial services industry was excluded from our sample. Firms 
with missing data throughout the five-year period were also excluded. Our final sample comprised 
319 firms.  
The ultimate ownership data were retrieved from the annual reports of the sample firms, 
particularly through the list of substantial shareholders. We traced the annual reports of particular 
listed firms in order to identify the ultimate owner. The ultimate ownership of a firm that was owned 
by privately held firms is identified based on the information of the notes disclosed under the list of 
substantial shareholders. In some cases, the ultimate ownership structure on the intermediary privately 
held firms is not disclosed, but we still included the firms in our sample as long as the identity of the 
ultimate owner is disclosed. Finally, we classified the identity of ownership into family, government, 
and foreign.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Graphical Evidence 
To investigate the hypotheses, we first present figures showing the association between 
excess value and ownership concentration of diversified and non-diversified firms, as well as the 
figures showing the diversification strategy and excess value according to firm identity. This 
graphical evidence is in support of our regression analysis. 
We start by plotting the association between excess value and ownership concentration 
(Figure 2). Excess value, as measured by the difference of market to sales ratio of actual value and 
imputed value, generally increases with the ownership in the hands of the largest owner (ultimate 
ownership). This pattern is consistent with the positive incentive effect of larger ownership on firm 
value. However, the relationship is non-monotonic. There is a quadratic relationship as the ownership 
by the largest shareholders 51-60%, for example, is associated with lower excess value than 
ownership of 41-50% for diversified firms, and the difference is significant. For the undiversified 
firms, there appears to be a cubical relationship in which the relationship between ownership and 
excess value is very high at the ownership of 11-20% but then drops significantly for ownership of 
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21-30%. The relationship rises again exponentially for ownership 41-50%, and subsequently falls for 
ownership of 51-60%. 
 
Figure 2 5-Year Average of Excess Value of firm 
 
The associations between value of diversification and the separation of firm identity, and 
between value of diversification and ownership rights are shown in Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5, and 
Figure 6. Figure 3 portrays an interesting dossier in which the excess value of foreign firms is higher 
than family firms, with government firms having the lowest. The figure also shows that family firms 
have the highest industrial diversification value, and government firms show an inconsistent trend. 
This result implies that industrial diversification as a value driver has a different impact for the 
different identities of firm. For instance, family firms have increasing diversification value, but result 
in a parabolic curve for excess value. Foreign firms have steady diversification value, but result in a 
strong varied-slope line. Lastly, government firms have a trigon shape for the value of diversification, 
but gain a steady and slow growth of excess value. In connecting these two charts (excess value and 
industrial diversification), it shows that, relatively, industrial diversification helps firms to have excess 
value. 
 
 
-0.2 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0-10% 11%-20% 21%-30% 31%-40% 41%-50% 51%-60% >60% 
Non Diversivied Diversified 
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Figure 3 Excess Values and Industrial Diversification Value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Excess Value of internationally and not-internationally diversified firms  
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Figure 4 shows the excess value of internationally and not-internationally diversified firms 
based on their identity. The figure suggests that internationally diversified firms perform better before 
2008 than non-internationally diversified firms, but less efficient afterwards. The foreign firms with 
international diversification strategy seem to be the worst among the others, where the value keeps 
decreasing year by year. This implies that internationally diversified foreign firms are worse-off 
compared to their peers (family and government). Taking 2008 as the pinpoint, our figures show the 
effect of the global crisis 2008 on international diversification strategy. Starting from 2008, firms with 
international diversification had cost their excess value, while firms that did not go internationally 
started to gain value.  
Additionally, we plot the relationship between ownership and excess value of industrially 
diversified and internationally diversified firms based on firm identity. Figure 5 suggests a quadratic 
relationship between ownership and excess value for family firms and foreign firms. It firstly shows 
that the higher the relationship, the higher the excess value. However, when it arrives at ownership of 
41-50% the relationship is declining. Interestingly, Figure 5 shows no trend for the relationship 
between ownership and excess value for government firms. 
The association between ownership and excess value of internationally diversified firms is 
shown in Figure 6. The figure suggests that the larger the wedge is between international 
diversification and ownership rights, the higher the excess value. This is only apparent for family 
firms and foreign firms, and not for government firms. Family firms start the trend with a positive 
excess value, while foreign firms start with a negative excess value. The plot also indicates that family 
firms are better in international diversification strategy relative to foreign firms. Meanwhile, the 
government firms outperform family firms and foreign firms if the ownership concentration is 31-
40% or higher than 60%.  
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Figure 5 Ownership and Excess Value of Industrially Diversified Firms 
 
 
Figure 6 Ownership and Excess Value of Internationally Diversified Firms 
 
 
4.2 Summary of descriptive statistics 
Table 3 describes the summary of statistics for our sample of 319 firms across the five-year 
period (2006-2010) according to the four categories: single industry-domestic, single industry-
international, multi-industry- domestic, and multi-industry-international. The mean values were 
calculated for each variable to facilitate comparison between the four categories. These mean values 
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are provided including the standard deviation values, which are depicted in parenthesis.  We also 
provide the statistical test of difference in the mean value for each variable across the four categories.  
As expected, firms with multi-industry-domestic combination have the largest average size 
among all four categories. This is followed by the single industry-domestic combination. This reveals 
that firms that apply a domestic strategy are conservative and have larger assets. Single industry firms 
tend to leverage their ability to achieve a better operation. This explains why the profitability 
(operating income to sales ratio) of a single industry is much higher than for multi-industry. 
Moreover, the profitability of multi-industry is reported to suffer a loss. This implies that single 
industry has a better profitability rate compared to multi-industry. Generally, single industry-
international firms have the highest growth (capital expenditure-sales ratio), and the other categories 
have a similar mean of growth (around 12%). However, the market to sales ratio of the combination 
of multi-industry-domestic has the highest value of average mean. The second highest is single 
industry-domestic categories. We find that single industry-international has a negative value. This 
indicates that domestic firms have better performance (value of firm) than internationally diversified 
firms. The ownership concentration is also interesting. The multi-industry firms have an average of 
57% of ownership. Meanwhile, the single industry has 53% and 61% for domestic and international, 
respectively. 
 
4.3 The moderating role of Ultimate Ownership on the relationship between excess value and 
diversification 
The estimates of Model (2) in Table 4 are retrieved by using five different inferential 
statistical methods. With short panel data (number of firms significantly larger than number of years), 
we report the probability values based on White robust standard errors that control for 
heteroscedasticity errors, as well as firm clustering, year clustering, period effect, and industry effect, 
which induce a within firm serial correlation error structure. The five panel regression estimations 
with different formations of robustness for panel regression provide estimations of the R2 values, 
which range from 10% to 19%. Basically, the coefficient estimated for all the control variables is 
consistent in sign, significance and magnitude across the various specifications. We find that the 
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estimated coefficient of ROIS (relative operating income to sales ratio), RCES (relative capital 
expenditure to sales ratio), and RLEV (relative leverage ratio) is positive and significant in association 
with excess value. This means that a firm with a higher profitability, higher growth opportunities, and 
higher leverage is most likely to have higher excess value; this finding is similar to previous 
diversification research. Note that we find firm size has a negative and not significant effect on the 
excess value. Even though it is consistent with prior research (i.e., Fauver et al., 2004; Lee, 2012), it is 
interesting to see the negative coefficient of size variable indicating that the larger the firm, the 
smaller the excess value. 
The estimation for Model (2) shows that excess value is positively related to industrial 
diversification and international diversification. Thus, only industrial diversification has a significant 
effect on excess value. This result shows that Indonesian firms have experienced the benefit of 
industrial diversification and other diversification strategies, such as international and industrial-
international, and do not have any contribution on firm value. Our results are consistent with the 
benefit of industrial diversification by Stein (1997). 
The ownership concentration (UO) is also estimated in this model through the interactive term 
of UO and diversification strategy. UO contributes positively and is statistically significant to excess 
value indicating that the higher the concentration, the higher the excess value. This is in line with 
Figure 1 and consistent with Claessens et al. (2002). The interactive term results show that interaction 
with industrial diversification (INDUO) results in a negative and significant contribution of UO with 
excess value. Meanwhile, the interactive terms of UO with international diversification and industrial-
international diversification do not have any effect on excess value. Borrowing the postulation of the 
three-step Model of Baron and Kenny (1986), UO has a moderating role on the relationship between 
industrial diversification and excess value. When UO interacts with industrial diversification, it has a 
significant relationship implying that a high ownership concentration firm would cost excess value to 
firms with a high level of industrial diversification. This is consistent with the entrenchment 
hypothesis (see Claessens et al., 2002).  
Fauver et al. (2003) stated that a certain level of ownership concentration might reduce the 
value of diversification suggesting that agency problems partly account for firms’ value-reducing 
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diversification strategies. Further, the findings of Lins and Servaes (2002) are also in line with ours, in 
that they found that the diversification discount in their sample – including companies from seven 
Asian emerging markets – to be driven by firms with managerial ownership in the 10% to 30% range, 
where they expect managerial entrenchment to be highest. They also find the diversification discount 
to be most severe when the insiders’ voting rights exceed their cash flow rights by 25% or more. 
Overall, we conclude that our findings partially support our hypotheses. The results indicate 
that there are differences in the valuation of diversified firms. After introducing the interactive terms, 
the UO and excess value have an inverse relationship, but only for industrially diversified firms. It is 
possible that these differences are caused by the identity of firms or the level of ownership 
concentration. As depicted in Figure 1, the excess value of diversified firms increases, but then 
declines after 50% ownership concentration. Therefore, our findings suggest that further inquiries into 
the effect of identity and the effect of the level of ownership concentration are warranted. We perform 
these tests in the following section. 
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Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics 
For the mean value, figures in the parenthesis are standard deviation; SW t test refers to Satterthwaite-Welch's t test and the figures in the parenthesis under SW t test are p-
values. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
  Single Industry Multi-Industry Satterthwaite–Welch's t test 
 
Domestic 
(1) 
International 
(2) 
Domestic 
(3) 
International 
(4) 
(1)-(2) (1)-(3) (1)-(4) (2)-(3) (2)-(4) (3)-(4) 
N 38 13 219 49 
      
Total Assets (bil $) 5.2248 2.0407 5.4462 2.8854 0.0804 -0.5949
 ***
 -0.8740
 ***
 -0.2311
 **
 -0.7100
 *
 -0.4176
 ***
 
 
(13.0983) (1.5425) (12.5168) (2.5049) (0.7890) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0230) (0.0620) (0.0061) 
Leverage 0.6249 1.4227 0.3892 0.3892 0.8857
 ***
 -0.3844
 **
 -0.2986
 **
 0.0716 -1.2261
 ***
 -1.2977
 ***
 
 
(0.4280) (6.9845) (0.9571) (0.9571) (0.0000) (0.0150) (0.0380) (0.5080) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Operating Income/Sales 0.1188 0.1343 -0.0259 -0.0259 0.0769
 **
 0.0275
 **
 -0.1578
 ***
 -0.1407
 **
 -0.0693
 **
 0.0477
 **
 
 
(0.1494) (0.1339) (0.5063) (0.5063) (0.0110) (0.0450) (0.0080) (0.0103) (0.0135) (0.0358) 
Capital Expenditure/ Sales 0.1272 0.1571 0.1217 0.1217 0.0334
 **
 0.0590 -0.0265
 *
 -0.0737
 *
 -0.0501
 **
 0.0208
 *
 
 
(0.1687) (0.3214) (0.2418) (0.2418) (0.0429) (0.1660) (0.0686) (0.0940) (0.0253) (0.0575) 
market/Sales 1.0294 -0.0285 2.3580 0.2608 1.0579 0.7686
 *
 -1.3286
 *
 -0.2894
 *
 -2.3865 -2.0972 
 
(2.9599) (0.4834) (28.3852) (0.8152) (0.0545)
 *
 (0.0776) (0.0738) (0.0592) (0.2380) (0.2994) 
Ownership Concentration 53.5123 61.3708 57.1852 57.1281 2.4254
 ***
 -4.6514 -6.2868
 **
 -0.2044
 **
 3.1969
 *
 5.7192
 ***
 
  (22.6311) (26.6097) (22.2138) (19.4584) (0.0030) (0.4240) (0.0160) (0.0400) (0.0520)  (0.0050) 
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Table 4 
Estimates of Diversification Strategy, Ownership Concentration, and Excess Value 
The regression is performed using five different specifications. The figures stated are the coefficient values, 
except numbers in parentheses, which are p-values. The dependent variable is the excess value of firms. The 
control variables are relative size (RSIZE), relative profitability (ROIS), relative growth (RCES), and relative 
leverage (LRDE). The main independent variables are the industrial diversification (DIND), international 
diversification (DINT), industrial-international diversification (INTIND), ownership concentration (UO), and its 
interactive terms (INDUO, INTUO, and INTINDUO). The model is as follows:  
titi
tititititiINDtiINTtitititi
UOINTIND
UOINDUOINTUODINTINDDDRLEVRCESROISRLTAValue
,,12
,11,10,8,7,,6,,5,4,3,2,1
)*(
)*()*(



  
 
Panel Regression Estimation of Model (2) 
RSIZE -0.0759 -0.0775 -0.0572 -0.0468 -0.0320 
 
(0.6641) (0.6616) (0.7479) (0.7649) (0.8221) 
ROIS 0.0417
***
 0.0417
 ***
 0.0409
 ***
 0.0483
 ***
 0.0443
 ***
 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0034) 
RCES 0.6319 0.6880
 *
 0.6530
 *
 0.9757
 *
 0.7865
 ***
 
 
(0.1116) (0.0664) (0.0878) (0.0008) (0.0059) 
LRDE 0.2454
 ***
 0.2457
 ***
 0.2486
 ***
 0.4780
 ***
 0.4728
 ***
 
 
(0.0100) (0.0077) (0.0098) (0.0000)  (0.0000 ) 
DIND 0.9994
*
 1.2724
**
 1.1502
 **
 1.2474
 ***
 0.7887
 **
  
 
(0.0729) (0.0197) (0.0369) (0.0015) (0.0217) 
DINT 0.5099 0.3929 0.4456 0.5626 0.7252 
 
(0.3107) (0.4423) (0.3833) (0.3262) (0.1869) 
INTIND -0.0850 -0.1750 -0.0671 -0.2687 0.0826 
 
(0.8829) (0.7612) (0.9066) (0.5887) (0.8337) 
UO 1.5686
 *
 1.8673
 **
 1.7973
 **
 2.0724
 ***
 1.5988
 **
  
 
(0.0699) (0.0248) (0.0322) (0.0040) (0.0102) 
INDUO -2.0451
 **
 -2.6170
 ***
 -2.3366
 ***
 -2.7141
 ***
 -1.6852
 **
  
 
(0.0188) (0.0021) (0.0067) (0.0002) (0.0168) 
INTUO -0.6160 -0.4545 -0.5195 -0.7699 -1.0330 
 
(0.3977) (0.5504) (0.4871) (0.4288) (0.2503) 
INTINDUO -0.0481 0.0804 -0.0266 0.2204 -0.2374 
 
(0.9534) (0.9227) (0.9740) (0.7679) (0.6529) 
CONSTANT -3.2670
 ***
 -2.4983
 ***
 -3.2653
 ***
 -3.0464
 ***
 -3.6418
 ***
 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm Clustered Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Clustered No No No Yes Yes 
Year Effect No Yes Yes No No 
Industry Effect Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 612 612 612 612 612 
R2 0.1862 0.1050 0.1926 0.1002 0.1904 
Adj R2 0.1753 0.1006 0.1812 0.1016 0.1918 
Note: 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
27 
 
4.4 Robustness Test with different types of firm identity 
So far, three important findings can be surmised from our earlier estimation. First, ownership 
concentration contributes positively and is statistically significant to excess value. Second, industrial 
diversification has a positively significant influence on excess value. Further, we also find that the 
interaction between UO and DIND (INDUO) shows a negative sign and is statistically significant to 
excess value. These findings might be correlated with the identity of the firms; hence, we further 
investigate and test our hypothesis 6 and hypothesis 7 that foreign firms and government firms in 
Indonesia outperform family firms in terms of diversification strategy. The agency cost can be 
addressed as an explanation for the underperformance of family firms (see Jensen, 1986; Anderson et 
al., 2003 for the details). To determine whether the diversification is related to firm’s identity, we 
estimate the regression, similar to the ones reported in Table 5, but we now separate the data set 
according to the identity of each type of firm, namely, family, foreign, and government.  
Table 5 shows a significant effect for industrial diversification on excess value for family 
firms, for which the coefficient value is 2.7348. The ownership concentration also contributes 
positively and is statistically significant with a coefficient value of 0.0298. When the ownership 
concentration interacts with industrial diversification, the results show a negative sign. Meanwhile, 
international diversification does not have any impact on family firms in Indonesia. As a result, family 
firms that are diversified and have high ownership concentration might suffer with value discount, 
which is consistent with Lins and Servaes (1999), Fauver et al. (2004), and Lee et al. (2012).  
In respect of foreign firms, the ownership concentration shows a positive and significant 
result to excess value with a coefficient value of 5.7349. Industrial diversification does not have any 
impact on excess value, but the international diversification does. This implies a partial supporting 
result for our hypothesis 6. The international diversification affects the excess value with a high 
coefficient value, which is 9.4016. When we interact the ownership concentration (UO) and the 
international diversification (DINT), which is INTUO, the findings show a statistically significant 
result, but with a negative sign. This indicates that foreign firms with higher ownership concentrations 
and that have international diversification, might reduce the excess value of foreign firms in 
Indonesia. Lastly, the government firms document no significant results except for the control 
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variable meaning that ownership concentration, industrial diversification, international diversification 
or the interactive terms do not have an impact on the excess value of government firms in Indonesia. 
These results also shed light on our earlier finding that diversification has a significant 
influence on excess value in Indonesia. Firms with different types of identity indicate different 
conclusions. For family firms, industrial diversification has an effect on excess value. Meanwhile, 
international diversification is the driver of excess value for foreign firms, and government firms do 
not have any impact of diversification. With further analysis, we note that internationally diversified 
foreign firms are relatively worse-off compared to family firms and government firms in terms of 
international diversification. We also note that industrially diversified family firms underperform 
foreign firms and government firms in terms of industrial diversification implying that family firms 
perform relatively much worse than foreign firms and government firms from being industrially 
diversified.  
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Table 5 
Diversification Strategy, Ownership Concentration, and Excess Value based on firm 
identity 
We firstly separate the data set based on the identity, which are family firm, foreign firm, and government firm. 
Then we run model (2) again. The regression is performed using panel regression based on White robust 
standard errors that control for heteroscedasticity errors, as well as firm clustering, year clustering, and industry 
effect, which induce a within firm serial correlation error structure. The figures stated are the coefficient values, 
except the numbers in parentheses which are p-values. The dependent variable is the excess value of firms. The 
control variables are relative size (RSIZE), relative profitability (ROIS), relative growth (RCES), and relative 
leverage (LRDE). The main independent variables are the industrial diversification (DIND), international 
diversification (DINT), industrial-international diversification (INTIND), ownership concentration (UO), and its 
interactive terms (INDUO, INTUO, and INTINDUO). The model is as follows:  
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UOINTUODINTINDDDRLEVRCESROISRLTAValue
,,12,11
,10,8,7,,6,,5,4,3,2,1
)*()*(
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  
Note: the figures stated is coefficient value, except, figures in the parenthesis are p-value; 
*
, 
**
, 
and 
***
 denotes statistical significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
  Family Foreign Government 
RSIZE -0.3907 -0.2374 0.2999 
 
(0.2920) (0.6840) (0.5586) 
ROIS 0.0413
**
  0.0515
***
 1.1095
 ***
 
 
(0.0135) (0.0045) 0.0000  
RCES 0.2671 1.356 1.8243
 ***
 
 
(0.6243) (0.1653) (0.0057) 
LRDE 0.2366 0.4494 0.1204 
 
(0.3833) (0.1571) (0.5556) 
DIND 2.7348
 **
  3.6386 1.2229 
 
(0.0187) (0.1323) (0.2295) 
DINT 4.0575 9.4016
 **
  -0.7869 
 
(0.2181) (0.0283) (0.3210) 
INTIND -1.544 -1.5602 0.8224 
 
(0.5901) (0.6950) (0.1638) 
UO 0.0298
 **
  5.7349
 **
  0.0103 
 
(0.0360) (0.0351) (0.6275) 
INDUO -0.0341
 **
  -5.4778 -0.0321 
 
(0.0421) (0.2450) (0.1567) 
INTUO -0.0491 -3.2693
 **
  0.032 
 
(0.2455) (0.0285) (0.1147) 
INTINDUO 0.0143 1.7377 -0.0106 
 
(0.6736) (0.7254) (0.5648) 
CONSTANT -3.3615
 ***
 -2.1975
 **
  -2.4704
 **
  
  (0.0018) (0.0232) (0.0201) 
N 477 81 51 
R2 0.2336 0.2091 0.387 
Adj R2 0.2352 0.2188 0.2141 
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4.5 Robustness Test with different levels of ultimate ownership level 
The results reported in the previous section suggest that diversification is costly for family 
firms and foreign firms, which might be caused by the ownership concentration level. So far, we have 
not explicitly controlled for the agency costs associated with ownership structure robustly. As we can 
see from Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck et al. (1988), and Fauver et al. (2004), there is a possibility 
that the value of diversification might be different for each level of ownership concentration.  
The previous estimation of model (2) has not given a clear conclusion regarding the 
association between ownership structure, diversification strategy, and firm value. Our concern is that 
the literature acknowledges that concentrated ownership is likely to reduce the conflicts that arise 
when there is a separation between managers and stockholders suggesting a positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and excess value (firm value). However, this is debatable, as the 
literature also shows that concentrated ownership provides large investors with opportunities to 
exploit minority shareholders implying a negative relationship between ownership concentration and 
excess value (firm value). 
Following Fauver et al. (2004), our thresholds are above 30% and above 50%. The details are as 
follows: 
 
UO30  = 0, total ownership ≤ 30%, 
= total ownership deducted by 30%, if total ownership > 30% 
UO50  = 0, total ownership ≤ 50%, 
= total ownership deducted by 50%, if total ownership > 50% 
 
We proceed by re-employing model 2 with a different threshold. The results show different 
conclusions except for the control variables. Profitability, growth, and leverage contribute positively 
and are statistically significant to excess value in all models. Meanwhile, size still does not have any 
significant effect on excess value. In terms of diversification strategies, being internationally 
diversified has no significant influence on excess value.  
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Table 6 consists of two main columns, namely, ownership concentration (hereafter UO) 
higher than 30% hereafter UO30) and UO higher than 50% (hereafter UO50). For all samples (not 
differentiated by the identity of sample), our findings document a decreasing impact of our main 
variables: diversification and UO. The industrial diversification has a decreasing coefficient from 
0.7878 (cluster firm with period and industry effect result in Table 4) to 0.3070. Meanwhile, the 
international diversification still does not have any impact, but the value is decreasing from 0.7252 of 
coefficient value (cluster firm with period and industry effect result in Table 4) to 0.5092. This means 
that the effect of the diversification strategy is diminishing when we put the threshold of ownership 
concentration at the 30% level. This remark is supported by the UO variable result, which we find has 
an increasing coefficient value. The coefficient value of UO was 1.5988 in our previous result (cluster 
firm with period and industry effect result in Table 4), and increased to 1.6014 in the UO30 results. 
This indicates a much stronger effect of UO on excess value when we increase the threshold to 30%. 
Furthermore, the UO30 column shows that an industrially diversified firm with a high UO may 
discount its excess value. However, the value discount effect is increasing in UO30. It was -1.6852 in 
our previous result (Table 4), and now becomes 1.7298 in UO30. In short, our result implies that a 
higher level of UO has a significant impact on diversification strategy, ownership concentration, and 
excess value. The higher the UO, the lower is the effect of diversification, and the higher is the value 
discount of diversification. 
 
We then continue by lifting up the threshold to 50% for a more robust conclusion. The UO50 
column documents no significant effects from the main variables that we previously found to be 
significant in Table 4 or the UO30 column. For UO50, the Industrial diversification still contributes 
positively with a much lower coefficient value, but it is not statistically significant to excess value. 
The UO gives the same conclusion, which is a much lower positive coefficient value and not 
statistically significant to excess value. In addition, the industrially diversified firms with a higher 
level of UO (INDUO) do not have any significant effect on excess value implying that the effect of 
value of industrial diversification is diminished at 50% of ownership concentration. Hence, the 
findings of UO30 and UO50 confirm our hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 5 – that ownership 
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concentration plays an important role as moderator in the relationship of diversification strategy and 
excess value. 
We attempt to investigate further hypotheses 4 and 5 with a different identity of firm to 
determine whether the effect of diversification also diminishes if we increase the threshold of UO. 
The results are quite intriguing. For family firms, we find that industrial diversification (DIND) is not 
statistically significant for UO30 with a negative value of coefficient. This shows that the industrial 
diversification strategy contributes negatively to family firms with an ownership concentration higher 
than 30%. The same conclusion is also found for UO50 where DIND contributes negatively and 
significantly to excess value. If we look at the UO variable result, it also shows a decreasing 
coefficient value from UO30 (0.6096) to UO50 (0.4805). The interactive terms also indicate that the 
effect of diversification on excess value is diminishing. Our previous results (refer to Table 4) 
document a value discount for industrial diversification. Now, in UO30 and UO50, even though it still 
indicates a value discount it is not statistically significant. These results imply that with higher 
ownership concentration, the effect of diversification on excess value diminishes for family firms in 
Indonesia.  
For foreign firms, we find a significant effect of industrial diversification on excess value at 
the 10% level for UO30 firms. However, this effect diminishes when we lift the concentration to 50% 
(UO50). The international diversification still has an effect on excess value but a lower coefficient 
value. The coefficient on international diversification declines to 5.4530 for UO30, and declines 
further for UO50 with a coefficient of 3.6431. The UO figures support these findings, where it 
increases from 5.7349 to 5.9605 for UO30, and keeps increasing to 9.0391 for UO50. We further find 
that the value discount of internationally diversified firms increases accordingly to the increase in 
ownership concentration. Before we use the threshold, the coefficient value is -3.2693. However, 
when we use the threshold of 30% and 50%, the coefficient values are -13.3885 and -16.0212, 
respectively. Note that the value discount of international diversification of foreign firms is not 
significant even at the 10% level. 
For the government firms, we do not find a significant effect of ownership effect. Making the 
threshold of ownership concentration 30% and 50% does not cause any significant change to 
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Indonesian government firms, except the industrially diversified government firms. There is a value 
discount for industrially diversified government firms, which it increases exponentially. Without a 
threshold the coefficient value of INDUO is only -0.0321. When we apply the thresholds of 30% and 
50%, the coefficient increases to -8.9115 and -18.5654, respectively. This implies that the value 
discount effect does occur for industrially diversified government firms with an ownership 
concentration of more than 50%, and that the discount is a substantial amount. 
In conclusion, Table 6 shows that ownership concentration affects the relationship between 
diversification strategy and excess value in Indonesia. We find a diminished relation from the 
predictors of excess value, except the ownership concentration. This means that firms with higher 
ownership concentration may not experience the excess value of diversification strategy. This 
robustness investigation supports our hypotheses 4 and 5, and is consistent with previous literature, 
such as Denis et al. (1997), Lins and Servaes (2002), Fauver et al. (2007), and Hoechle et al. (2012), 
who found that a larger ownership concentration might severe the value of diversification or even 
worse, diminish the effect. Our findings also support the cost of diversification rather than the support 
benefits of diversification indicating the existence of agency cost problems. 
 
4.6 Results Discussion 
Our study reveals that ownership concentration plays an important role concerning the value 
of the diversification strategy, which is consistent with previous empirical papers, such as Fauver et 
al. (2004), and Lee et al. (2012). Particularly, we identify five important findings. Firstly, we find the 
significant effect of industrial diversification, but no effect of international diversification on excess 
value. These findings are consistent with Lins and Servaes (1999), and Fauver et al. (2004) who 
considered agency problems as a strong motive for diversification associated with industrial groups. 
Of course, this argument does not explain which group uses extensive industrial diversification. We 
follow up this unjustified explanation by following the Claessen et al. (2002) and Fauver et al. (2004) 
by investigating further the ownership concentration and the identity of firms. We then proceed by 
clustering the diversification strategy-performance following their identity. The results demonstrate 
interesting findings in which industrially diversified family firms with a high level of ownership 
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concentration might reduce their excess value by undertaking industrial diversification. However, 
international diversification may not harm the family firm. We further find that even though 
international diversification and ownership concentration have positive and significant influences on 
foreign firms’ excess value, internationally diversified foreign firms experience the value discount. 
This implies that foreign firms are relatively worse-off in doing international diversification compared 
to their peer family firms and government firms. In a further investigation, we find different results 
from Lee et al. (2012) in respect of the value of diversification for government firms. The results 
show there is no significant effect for the value of diversification on government firms, meaning that 
no benefits or costs occur in the diversification strategy of government firms. 
These findings partially support the agency cost hypothesis of Jensen (1986) and Stulz 
(1990). It seems that the agency problem is more associated with family firms and foreign firms that 
apply a diversification strategy rather than to government firms. This suggests that these family-
controlled firms are resource poor as industrially diversified compared to foreign and government-
owned firms that possess stronger resources. This also applies to foreign firms undertaking 
international diversification. This suggests that the mechanism to permit a smooth reallocation of 
money among investment projects through the internal markets only works well for government firms 
in Indonesia. This is different from what we see in Malaysia, where family firms outperform foreign 
and government firms (see Lee et al., 2012). This also suggests that government firms may have the 
incentive to diversify and have better expertise in managing the complexity of diversification settings. 
Most probably, the reason behind it is the anti-corruption law No 31 year 1999, which defines 
corruption as the occurred losses to the country. This makes government firms more prudent in 
undertaking diversification strategies. Anecdotal evidence documents that several executives of 
government firms went to jail because of incorrect strategy and policy
2
 leading the management of 
government firms to have extra understanding of diversification. This also explains why government 
firms relatively outperform foreign firms in certain extensions. If the decision to diversify reflects 
                                                 
2
 See the case of ECW Neloe, former director of Bank Mandiri (the largest bank in Indonesia) or Sri Mulyani, 
former Finance Minister and current managing director of World Bank 
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/bank-century-case-still-vague-2/ and 
http://workersindependentnews.colo.supranet.net/node/6567 
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value-destroying for family firms and foreign firms, the explanations are various and  inadequately 
justified in corporate governance. For instance, the value discount of diversification is because of 
firms wrong acquisition strategy (Morck et al., 1990, Lins and Servaes, 1999), or because firms 
acquire unrelated industries to their business chain or nature (Schoar, 2002). 
The ownership concentration also plays a role in the link between diversification and 
performance. First, it shows that higher ownership concentration may induce the excess value of firms 
indicating that the higher control of firms will lead to an increase in performance. Our results also 
show that a high ownership concentration may diminish the effect of diversification on excess value. 
Firms with concentration of ownership higher than 30% have worse results compared to the lower 
threshold. When we raise the threshold to 50% ownership concentration, the effect diminishes. Our 
results support the agency cost hypothesis, and not the efficient internal capital market, where 
ownership concentration might lead to a decline in the value of the firm. This is confirmed from our 
identity model in which family firms that have a highly concentrated ownership, might have 
discounted value but the effect is absent at the 30% and 50% threshold.  
For foreign firms, we found that internationally diversified foreign firms have the value 
discount. The value discount is increasing at the threshold of 30% and much bigger at the 50% 
ownership concentration. However, the significant effect is diminished when the threshold is at the 
50% level. Meanwhile, government firms have no effect on the value of diversification. These 
findings are contrary to the internal capital market hypothesis.  
Note that one of the alleged benefits of corporate diversification is that it allows for the 
creation of an internal capital market that functions more efficiently than the external market, 
especially in a less-developed capital market, such as Indonesia. The diversification results in costs 
rather than benefits to firms. This is in line with large investor-firm performance hypothesis of Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), who stated that large ownership is able to collect information and oversee 
managers. If the agency cost of diversification strategy occurs inside the firms due to the personal 
motive of managers and causes the value discount of diversification, large ownership has a strong 
incentive to put pressure on managers as they can give full and special attention to the firms. Most 
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probably, the large ownership takes action to stop value-reducing of diversification when they receive 
information about no excess value of diversification strategy. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our study investigates the value of diversification strategies by different ownership 
concentrations and different firm identities in an emerging country context. Our study is mainly 
motivated by the lack of attention given to emerging countries, such as Indonesia, despite the unique 
characteristics of ownership concentration, and steady growth of diversification strategies taken by 
Indonesian firms. This paper might provide the foundation and benchmark for any further research on 
this topic concerning emerging markets with more focus on country-specific characteristic 
dimensions. 
This paper is an extension of diversification-performance studies with different settings. We 
follow and modify Lins and Servaes (1999), and Fauver et al. (2004) to match with our objective of 
research and definition. Our results have implications for certain frameworks, and evidence in this 
field from developed markets may not necessarily apply to emerging markets. Our study also 
investigates the role of ownership concentration on the relationship of diversification-performance. 
Another contributing aspect of our study is that we use the panel data approach that allows for 
assessing changes in the diversification level over time albeit there were no significant changes in 
both the diversification levels over time, thus giving more reliable estimates. 
The focus of our study is to examine the value of diversification strategies, industrially and 
internationally, by controlling the ownership concentration and identity. Based on certain common 
characteristics for emerging markets, particularly for East Asian countries, which are dominated by 
family firms, this research can be extended further. For instance, future research may investigate the 
value of diversification by attributing internal factors, such as manager ability or political involvement 
in board structure, will make another interesting extension of study in this field. 
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Table 6 
The new estimations based on new Threshold 
We change the threshold of ownership concentration to 30% and 50%, and then re-retrieve the data of ownership concentration (UO) and the identity of firms. Then we run model (2) again. First, 
we re-employ Model (2) for the new threshold of UO without dividing it into the identity, and call it ALL. Then, we repeat the procedure of the new threshold of 30% and 50% with different firm 
identities. The regression is performed using panel regression based on White robust standard errors that control for heteroscedasticity errors, as well as firm clustering, year clustering, and 
industry effect, which induce a within firm serial correlation error structure. The figures stated are the coefficient values, except numbers in parentheses, which are p-values. The dependent 
variable is the excess value of firms. The control variables are relative size (RSIZE), relative profitability (ROIS), relative growth (RCES), and relative leverage (LRDE). The main independent 
variables are the industrial diversification (DIND), international diversification (DINT), industrial-international diversification (INTIND), ownership concentration (UO), and its interactive terms 
(INDUO, INTUO, and INTINDUO). The model is as follows:  
tititititititiINDtiINTtitititi UOINTINDUOINDUOINTUODINTINDDDRLEVRCESROISRLTAValue ,,12,11,10,8,7,,6,,5,4,3,2,1 )*()*()*(    
  UO>30% UO>50% 
  All Family Foreign Government All Family Foreign Government 
RSIZE -0.0314 0.1634 -0.2367 0.6179 * -0.0354 0.1684 -0.3996 0.497* 
 
(0.8251) (0.2860) (0.6793) (0.0642) (0.8080) (0.2762) (0.4709) (0.0966) 
ROIS 0.0445*** 0.4555*** 0.0533*** 0.8555*** 0.0422*** 0.4603*** 0.0542*** 0.7777*** 
 
(0.0022) 0.0000 (0.0067) (0.0012) (0.0010) 0.0000 (0.0072) (0.0029) 
RCES 0.7808*** 0.9218*** 1.3713 2.0578*** 0.7679*** 0.9275*** 1.6982 1.9393*** 
 
(0.0053) (0.0043) (0.1678) (0.0012) (0.0060) (0.0052) (0.1078) (0.0064) 
LRDE 0.4728*** 0.4090*** 0.4514 0.2281 0.4766*** 0.4180*** 0.4500 0.3097 
 
(0.0000) 0.0000 (0.1595) (0.5407) (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.2027) (0.3404) 
DIND 0.3070* -0.4029 2.1056* 0.6608 0.0112 -0.5573*** 1.7634 0.4761 
 
(0.0985) (0.1745) (0.0941) (0.5631) (0.9383) (0.0032) (0.1153) (0.6990) 
DINT 0.5092 0.3176 5.4530** 0.0032 0.3485 0.138 3.6431 * 0.0247 
 
(0.1374) (0.4833) (0.0293) (0.9958) (0.1721) (0.6391) (0.0759) (0.9716) 
INTIND -0.0379 -0.2459 -1.0677 1.053 -0.0235 -0.1094 -0.8231 0.4659 
 
(0.8970) (0.6253) (0.6747) (0.2389) (0.9017) (0.6983) (0.6182) (0.2703) 
UO 1.6014 ** 0.6096 5.9605** 2.2822 1.3776 0.4805 9.0391 3.672 
 
(0.0149) (0.4939) (0.0383) (0.4182) (0.1558) (0.6565) (0.1782) (0.5418) 
INDUO -1.7298 ** -0.6987 -5.8085 -8.9115*** -1.2439 -0.2634 -9.0992 -18.5654*** 
 
(0.0225) (0.4915) (0.2422) 0.0000 (0.2269) (0.8302) (0.3459) 0.0000 
INTUO -1.3581 -1.0019 -13.3885 ** 0.3732 -1.8941 -0.8593 -16.0212 1.9821 
 
(0.1676) (0.4186) (0.0284) (0.8498) (0.1171) (0.5587) (0.1240) (0.6932) 
INTINDUO -0.0571 0.4139 1.8161 -2.3624 -0.3402 -0.0427 1.3455 -1.8274 
 
(0.9174) (0.6546) (0.7159) (0.2701) (0.5449) (0.9499) (0.7590) (0.3990) 
CONSTANT -3.1810*** -2.5384*** -8.4417 ** -2.3403 * -2.9329*** -2.4273*** -6.1885 ** -2.5588*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0149) (0.0528) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0229) (0.0029) 
N 612 477 81 51 612 477 81 51 
R2 0.19 0.2328 0.3994 0.5881 0.1868 0.2313 0.3697 0.5767 
Adj R2 0.1914 0.2344 0.4068 0.5962 0.1881 0.2329 0.3775 0.585 
Note: the figures stated are the coefficient values, except the figures in parenthesis, which are p-values; 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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